As the convener of the Finance and Constitution Committee, I am pleased to open this debate on the committee’s interim report on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The interim report is the culmination of the committee’s scrutiny of the bill from the summer recess through to the bill completing its passage through the House of Commons. The committee will produce a final report prior to the final amending stage in the House of Lords.
I put on record my sincere appreciation and thanks for my fellow committee members and the constructive and productive manner in which they approached their work on the bill. Their commitment to the Scottish Parliament and to the principles underpinning the devolution settlement have enabled us to reach unanimous recommendations. I record particular thanks for the support that I received during the committee’s deliberations from my deputy convener, Adam Tomkins. I also thank our expert advisers, Christine O’Neill and Nicola McEwen, for their input to the committee’s deliberations. Our clerking team, led by Jim Johnston, deserve particular recognition for the outstanding support that they provided.
There has been much commentary and discussion about what the contents of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill mean for the devolution settlement in Scotland—indeed, for the territorial politics of the United Kingdom more generally. Without doubt, the bill is complex and frequently obscure in its meaning and purpose. Mark Elliot, the constitutional lawyer, from the University of Cambridge, said:
“to say that it is byzantine in nature would be to do a disservice to the Byzantine Empire. The Bill is ... unnecessarily complex, ambiguous and tortuous in both structure and drafting”.
In scrutinising the bill, the committee sought to bring clarity to the implications of the withdrawal bill’s provisions for devolution. In doing so, we have engaged with stakeholders from sectors that will be impacted by Brexit—organisations from the agriculture, environmental, fishing and education sectors as well as academics and constitutional lawyers. We have taken evidence from UK and Welsh Government ministers and, of course, from the Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europe, Mike Russell.
While the bill may be complex, there is no doubt that it represents a fundamental challenge to the devolution settlement and that, as currently drafted, it undermines the principles upon which this Parliament was established. There are various aspects of the bill that undermine this institution, but I want to confine my comments to two issues in particular: clause 11; and common frameworks.
Clause 11 has been a significant focus of the committee’s scrutiny, given the direct impact of the clause on the devolution settlement. In essence, the clause performs a very simple function: it removes the restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament legislating in a manner that is incompatible with EU law and replaces that with a new restriction on the Scottish Parliament legislating in areas of retained EU law that were outwith devolved competence prior to the UK exiting the EU. The bill places no similar such restriction on Westminster. In effect, it returns EU powers to Westminster, including EU competences that fall within devolved competences. While there is a process in the bill for releasing powers to Holyrood, where the UK and Scottish Governments agree to do so, there is no timescale in the bill governing that process. Therefore, there is no guarantee that powers will be returned to Holyrood.
The UK Government has produced a list of 111 areas in which EU competences intersect with the devolution settlement. Those powers cover a wide spectrum of devolved competences from agriculture to environment, justice matters to onshore fracking and rail franchising to state-aid rules. The evidence that the committee took was remarkably consistent in emphasising that clause 11 not only undermines the devolution settlement, but would result in a fundamental shift in the structure of devolution from a reserved-powers model to a conferred-powers model. Such a shift would inevitably create an increasingly complex boundary between devolved and reserved powers.
Critically, witnesses stressed that, despite assurances from UK ministers that clause 11 is intended to be a temporary measure, there are no provisions in the bill to that effect. The deputy convener of the Finance and Constitution Committee may disagree, but constitutional lawyers are not necessarily known for the stridency of their positions—although he may, of course, be the exception to the rule. However, that was not the case in respect of the views that the committee heard on clause 11. I will pick out just one quote, from Professor Richard Rawlings of University College London, to give a sense of the strength of view that the committee heard in evidence. He said:
“The sooner clause 11 of the Withdrawal Bill is cast aside, the better. .... An unthinking form of ‘Greater England’ unionism, which assumes only limited territorial difference, would be another way of characterising this.”
The committee has been very clear in its view of clause 11: we consider that it represents a fundamental shift in the structure of devolution. Regardless of whether the Scottish Parliament obtains new powers as a result of Brexit, clause 11 will adversely impact on the intelligibility and integrity of the devolution settlement. Clause 11 as currently drafted is, therefore, incompatible with the devolution settlement, and it is not a necessary precursor to the agreement of common frameworks. In short, the committee cannot recommend legislative consent to the bill unless clause 11 is replaced or removed.
In the report, the committee noted the statement by the Secretary of State for Scotland on 6 December that the UK Government intended to table amendments to clause 11. I place my personal view on record in stating my dismay and grave concern that the UK Government did not, as expected, table amendments to clause 11 at report stage in the House of Commons.
The seriousness of the situation cannot be overstated. It is imperative that the UK Government brings forward amendments in the House of Lords to replace or remove clause 11 at the earliest opportunity. In other words, if a constitutional crisis is to be averted, it is vital that the UK Government brings forward changes to the bill that properly respect the devolution settlement.
I wish to comment briefly on the committee’s recommendations in relation to common frameworks. The term “common frameworks” can mean many things, but broadly it refers to EU policy frameworks that may require to be replicated at a UK level post-Brexit. Such frameworks could take a variety of forms, such as legislative frameworks, looser forms of co-operation via concordats or memorandums of understanding, or even a simple exchange of letters. In the view of the UK Government, those frameworks are necessary to enable the effective functioning of the UK market.
The Scottish and Welsh Governments agree that there will be a requirement for some common UK frameworks to replace EU frameworks post-Brexit. However, they fundamentally disagree with the UK Government on what the starting point should be for agreeing common frameworks. The UK Government believes that EU powers should be repatriated to Westminster to provide certainty and stability to the UK Government, particularly as regards negotiations with the EU. Then, in the view of the UK Government, consideration should be given to which powers should be included in common frameworks and which powers should be devolved. For the Scottish and Welsh Governments, the starting point is which devolved powers should be included in common frameworks with the consent of devolved Governments and legislatures. It is important to stress that the bill contains no provisions on common frameworks; instead, they have been the subject of intergovernmental discussions.
The committee welcomes the progress that has been made between the Scottish and UK Governments on developing an approach to agreeing common frameworks. We also welcome the commitment from the UK Government that common frameworks will not be imposed. However, the committee strongly believes that not only the process but the content of common frameworks must not be imposed. In addition, the committee strongly believes that the process is not solely a matter for Governments but must be transparent and inclusive to enable this Parliament and wider stakeholders to scrutinise any agreement that is reached intergovernmentally.
I want to mention the interparliamentary forum on Brexit, which brings together committee conveners and deputy conveners from legislatures across the UK that are engaged in scrutiny of the Brexit process. Adam Tomkins and I, and colleagues from the Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Relations Committee and Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, attended a meeting of the forum last week. We took the opportunity to stress to colleagues in other legislatures—particularly the House of Lords, given that the bill has now moved there—not just the messages in the Finance and Constitution Committee’s interim report but the seriousness of the situation as a whole. It is fair to say—I hope that others who attended the meeting agree—that our message was well received. Presiding Officer, I am sure that you will agree that that form of interparliamentary dialogue is a useful means of ensuring that the views of committees in this Parliament are clearly heard during the Brexit process.
In the view of the Finance and Constitution Committee, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill represents a fundamental challenge to this institution and the devolution settlement. It is imperative that the UK Government takes urgent action to ensure that the bill respects the devolution settlement. Only then would the Finance and Constitution Committee be able to recommend legislative consent.
I look forward to hearing the views of colleagues on the committee’s unanimous report. I move,
That the Parliament notes the recommendations of the Finance and Constitution Committee’s 1st Report 2018 (Session 5), European Union (Withdrawal) Bill LCM - Interim Report (SP Paper 255).
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