This group contains a large number of amendments that are aimed at the regulation-making powers in the bill. Many of the issues that are covered by the amendments and, indeed, the wording of some of the amendments themselves were considered and rejected at stage 2.
Let me start by setting out the considerable changes that have already been made to the bill with the aim of tightening the scope of, and increasing the scrutiny of, those regulation-making powers. I know that those are matters of concern to Parliament. I understand that concern, and the Scottish Government has responded to it.
The Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee made a specific recommendation about the equivalent powers in the EU withdrawal bill. It recommended that the test should be in two parts: the power should only ever be available where a test of necessity is met, and once that test is met, ministers should be empowered only to make the provision that they consider appropriate. Therefore, “necessary” and “appropriate” sit together. We have included that test of necessity in the continuity bill. It is not in the EU withdrawal bill. Under the continuity bill, Scottish ministers will be able to use the main fixing powers only where it is necessary to do so, with a test of necessity in the bill.
On introduction, the bill already reflected the recommendations of the Parliament’s committee that is dedicated to the scrutiny of statutory instruments. At stage 2, a number of amendments were made to the scope of those powers. The bill contains an exhaustive list of types of deficiency, and those had tests of necessity added to them by Opposition amendments at stage 2. For example, the type of deficiency that is described in section 11(2)(d) now exists only where it is “necessary” to
“make provision ... in connection with”
EU
“arrangements which ... no longer exist”
as a result of Brexit.
Those are both substantial and meaningful additional restrictions on the use of the powers in the continuity bill.
The position in the bill is the product of concessions that have been made by the Scottish Government and amendments that were made by the Finance and Constitution Committee at stage 2. When that committee finished its consideration of the bill in the chamber, late at night last week, I gave a commitment that the Government would return at stage 3 with a proposal to reverse any of the changes only if doing so was required to keep the bill operable—in other words, if the changes would prevent the bill from being able to do its job of preparing our laws for EU withdrawal.
Neil Findlay’s amendments 22 and 29, unfortunately, would do that. They would replace that second test that I described—that of allowing “appropriate” provision to be made once the test of necessity is met—with a further test of necessity. That is not what the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee recommended, and it would actually make the powers, in effect, impossible to exercise.
Sometimes, the type of provision that is required to address a deficiency in devolved law will require a choice to be made—for example, about which domestic body will take on a function that is currently exercised by the EU, or about how to adjust a reference to an EU instrument so that it continues to work after withdrawal. Having to make that choice might be necessary, and the bill already requires that, but having to choose the best options from a range of them could never be necessary.
Neil Findlay’s amendments 19 to 21, 26 to 28 and 45 also seek to constrain ministerial discretion in a way that could not work. They remove references to the Scottish ministers considering things to be necessary before the powers can be used, but they beg a question: if not the Scottish ministers, who will exercise these important powers? The tests of necessity and appropriateness and all the other legal tests in the bill will have to be considered to have been met by someone, and that someone will of course be the Scottish ministers. It will be the Scottish ministers’ judgment and discretion that are scrutinised when the regulations come before Parliament for scrutiny, and it will be the Scottish ministers who will be held to account. It could never be otherwise.
I mentioned at stage 2 the Government’s desire to make sure that the right balance is struck. As part of that balancing exercise, I actually commend to the Parliament Jamie Greene’s amendments 31 to 34. They make four further changes to the substance of the power in section 13, changing the word “appropriate” to the word “necessary”. That brings section 13 into line with changes that were made to sections 11 and 12 at stage 2.
Those amendments also address a concern that was raised at stage 2 by Graham Simpson, who suggested use of the word “operable”. We consider that use of the word “necessary” represents a higher test and should address that concern, particularly given the other amendments that the Government has lodged and supported in respect of the keeping-pace power.
As I said, I committed at stage 2 to seek to reverse any amendments that were made at that stage only if, after carefully considering them, I concluded that their effect was to render the bill or part of it inoperable. I have concluded that there is only one such amendment, and I seek the Parliament’s support in adjusting the position back. Amendment 23 proposes to change the word “necessary” back to “appropriate” in section 11(2)(f)(ii), but not in any of the other parts of the test. That is the one area where we believe that the deficiency has to be described by reference to the standard of appropriateness.
The provision is concerned with a deficiency in law that arises where retained EU law does not contain any functions that should be kept after withdrawal. The test was amended at stage 2 so that it referred to a lack of functions
“which it is necessary to retain”.
However, that could not work, because leaving the EU could arguably leave many functions, which we might all wish to retain, unnecessary. There could be functions that we would all be desperate to see kept going but which, being strictly not necessary, had to be disposed of because of the amendment that was made at stage 2. For example, if there was an annual report that had to be submitted to the European Commission on a matter of environmental concern, keeping that function going after withdrawal could never be said to be necessary by the tests in the bill, but it might be appropriate to decide that the function of receiving the annual report should be conferred, instead, on the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Amendment 23 would allow such changes to be made; without it, we could be bound in law to eliminate functions that we want to keep. Taken with Jamie Greene’s amendments, which we support, it would mean that the same scheme applied across sections 11, 12 and 13.
15:45
I stress again that we have not lodged amendments to seek to reverse the new word “necessary” in sections 11(2)(c), 11(2)(d), 11(2)(e) or 11(2)(g), because we accept those changes. If the Parliament votes for my amendment 23 and Jamie Greene’s amendments 31 to 34, the result will be a strong set of logical limits on the ministerial powers in the bill that will be applied consistently across the bill’s provisions and which will have been strengthened at stages 2 and 3.
I invite the Parliament to reject amendment 54, which, in relation to the publication of a statement by ministers, would remove the words
“in such manner as Scottish Ministers consider appropriate”.
That is the same wording that is used in the EU withdrawal bill. I repeat that we do not think that the removal of those words would add anything at all to the bill. The Scottish ministers will be responsible for publishing those statements and, of course, they would have to do so in an appropriate manner.
I urge the Parliament to vote for amendment 23, which I will move, and for amendments 31 to 34, and to vote against the other amendments in the group.