There is quite a lot in the question. In assessing whether to align with any given EU measure, the ministers will consider factors such as practical implications, economic and social benefits and costs, resource implications in terms of budget or Government or parliamentary time, and whether an alternative approach would demonstrably deliver the same outcomes as or more ambitious outcomes than the relevant EU measure. Having considered all relevant factors, and if it is determined that aligning with an EU measure would be in Scotland’s best interests, as is the case with normal policy development, the Scottish Government will consult as appropriate. Any such consultation will allow the Government to consider the views of and possible impact on stakeholders.
In addition to the normal policy note, business and regulatory impact assessment and so on, the Scottish Government will lay explanatory statements, as set out in sections 5 and 6, to be scrutinised by the Parliament. Among other things, those statements will set out the reasoning behind the instrument and how retained EU law will be affected. Section 7 requires ministers to lay before Parliament an annual report setting out how the power under section 1(1) has been used in that reporting period.
I am aware that some stakeholders have called for the precise circumstances in which ministers might choose to align or not to be set out more clearly, and to perhaps have that in the bill. I feel that I should say that the Scottish ministers will always take decisions in the best interest of Scotland, taking into account the full impact of any such decision. As I have said, sections 5 and 6 require ministers to set out their reasoning for reaching any decisions to align.
The danger of setting out an explicit decision-making framework in the bill is that that would fail to take into account potentially unforeseen circumstances, and it could become overly prescriptive, potentially rendering the power ineffective.
I return to the views of the Faculty of Advocates. It considers that
“the range of EU law that might be the object of such regulations—both as to subject matter and nature of the instrument—is such that the definition of criteria within the Bill would be an impossible task.”
We welcome that view. We do not consider that providing for that in the bill would be helpful or appropriate, given how relevant factors change.
In relation to scrutiny of any regulations made under the power, section 4(2) sets out the type of provision that, if included in regulations, will be subject to the affirmative procedure. It states:
”That provision is provision which—
(a) abolishes a function of an EU entity or a public authority in a member State without providing for an equivalent function to be exercisable by any person,
(b) provides for a function mentioned in section 1(3) or (4) to be exercisable by a Scottish public authority, or by a different Scottish public authority (as the case may be), or by any person whom the Scottish public authority authorises to carry out functions on its behalf,
(c) falls within section 1(5), regarding the charging of fees or other charges in connection with the exercise of a function by a Scottish public authority, except for provision which relates only to altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money,
(d) creates, or widens the scope of, a criminal offence,
(e) creates or amends a power to legislate.”
Anything not listed will be subject to either the affirmative or the negative procedure. In those cases, there is a choice of procedure—the so-called “either way provision”.
I am aware that there have been calls for the enhanced affirmative procedure to apply when provision is made that amounts to substantial policy considerations or something similar. However, I think that that would be difficult to operate in practice, given how unclear that test is and how difficult it would be to define. Applying it would effectively involve a subjective assessment of whether any provision meets the test, and the test could open the door to speculative legal challenges where it could be argued that a different procedure could apply. Therefore, the Scottish Government considers that the scrutiny procedures chosen for the power in section 1(1) represent a good balance between allowing for effective and thorough scrutiny of the power, and ensuring that it is sufficiently flexible to allow the Government, where appropriate, to respond quickly where legislative changes are needed, and—