You are not alone in commending the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee for its sterling work. It is a fashion in legislation that primary legislation—acts of the Scottish Parliament—frequently loan law-making powers to the Scottish ministers and that those are implemented through a range of regulatory powers that the DPLR Committee struggles, albeit successfully, to scrutinise properly, doing its best to ensure that the law is compliant with the parent act.
Our broad themes for dealing with legislation—if you do not mind a slight digression before I get to the meat of your question—include that there should be adequate parliamentary scrutiny to uphold the rule of law when making legislation in respect of the coronavirus. We have seen broad regulation-making powers in, say, section 11 of the Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020 and section 14 of the Coronavirus (Scotland) (No 2) Act 2020. Those sections deal with significant new powers to deal with the coronavirus pandemic.
Parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation was not of the standard that we would ordinarily expect when dealing with primary legislation in the Scottish context. It was certainly a lot better than the United Kingdom Parliament’s consideration of its Coronavirus Act 2020, which went through all its stages in the House of Commons in one day on 23 March last year. Even so, we could do better in the future when making legislation that affects public health and emergency circumstances.
The key to good law making is practicality, consistency, clarity and accessibility. A lot of that comes from having adequate pre-legislative consultation. In order to do that, we have to know what the Government is thinking about, so that it is able to issue consultation documents and get views from a broad range of stakeholders. Those who are figuratively around the table today represent some of those voices.
We were also concerned about respect for human rights. Lots of the provisions in the acts and the subordinate legislation intrude on some of our fundamental rights. They engage the European convention on human rights in a number of ways, including in the criminal justice sphere and on freedom of movement and the right to a family life. We must be aware that human rights should be foremost in our future considerations, and we should take account of the competence provisions of the Parliament.
On subordinate legislation, you are correct—there were 132 Scottish statutory instruments at the point at which we wrote our briefing. One of the orders that the committee will consider, the Coronavirus (Scotland) Acts (Early Expiry and Suspension of Provisions) Regulations 2021, is a made affirmative instrument. The fact that it comes ready-made presents the Scottish Parliament with a difficulty. Can we have enough scrutiny of legislation that is essentially already effected, even if it might not come into force for some time yet?
That leads me to the extent to which subordinate legislation is used, and to the bulk of it. There have been 22 Scottish statutory instruments since the turn of the year, and there have been 25 regulations amending the Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel) (Scotland) Regulations 2020. We are dealing with the product of a Government that is trying to catch up with the movement of the virus and trying to be agile and flexible enough to deal with issues as they appear. The disease spreads and the expertise of scientists and virologists is applied to that. Those who are unwell are mapped. It is important that we bear in mind that this is an extraordinary situation, but I think that we can do better.
The question why the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 was not deployed is a matter over which people still argue. We must settle on what the law is by having something that is fit for purpose in the 21st century and agile enough to deal with fast-moving situations while satisfying the requirements of proper legislative scrutiny, including pre-legislative scrutiny.
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The Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee should be looking at something that sketches the landscape for the future. We must also bear it in mind that the Public Audit and Post-legislative Scrutiny Committee has a post-legislative scrutiny function. Perhaps there could be some way in which both the DPLR Committee and the PAPLS Committee could engage with the issue, bringing the pre-legislative and subordinate legislation skills of the former to the post-legislative scrutiny role of the latter.