I would have given way after I finished my point. I am happy to look back on what Neil Findlay said, but he said, in a way, that the bill is not supported by victims of hate crime, and I tell him that it is supported by victims of hate crime. I have just read out a list, and I could go on. I gently suggest to him that, when he is purporting to speak on behalf of victims of hate crime, he should speak to the organisations that have represented victims of hate crime for many years.
I agree with many members who have spoken about the issue that we are discussing during the parliamentary process. Some have argued that there is a tension between hate crime law and freedom of expression, but I am not persuaded by that. I do not think that the two have to be mutually exclusive, and I think that there can be strong protections in law against hate crime and strong freedom of expression provisions.
Let me state very clearly that the bill has never been about prosecuting the offensive. In fact, the word “offensive” does not appear in the bill. I and others might find a person’s speech to be distasteful, abhorrent and deeply offensive, but that in itself is not a ground for prosecution under the bill.
The bill is fundamentally different from what it was when it was introduced to the Parliament. Many changes have been made; Adam Tomkins articulated some of them well, particularly in relation to the stirring up of hatred offences in part 2. The bill now requires the following: that there is an intention to stir up hatred; that the court will objectively assess whether behaviour or material is threatening or abusive; that each element of the stirring up of hatred offences is to be proven beyond reasonable doubt with corroborated evidence; and that there is the availability of a reasonableness defence.
The convener of the Justice Committee articulated things well when he said:
“The way in which the scope of those offences has been narrowed and sharpened will do much more to protect and reassure than any formulation of words about freedom of expression”.—[Official Report, Justice Committee, 22 February 2021; c 29-30.]
I agree. The amendments in my name in the group will complement those safeguards. I agree with Adam Tomkins’s point. We need to have words on the face of the bill that give reassurance to people who have genuine and legitimate concerns about the impact of legislation—particularly, of course, this legislation—on their free speech and freedom of expression.
Amendment 11 was one of the four options that I provided to the Justice Committee for the round-table session. I agree that that was a very good session. The issue has had a lot of scrutiny. I was quite persuaded by what Danny Boyle of BEMIS—an organisation that many members know—said about the harm that could be caused if race were included in any freedom of expression provision. He essentially argued that that freedom of expression provision does not exist in other stirring up of racial hatred offences across the UK, so why is race being included in our discussion? I was convinced by that argument.
Amendment 11 will tie the freedom of expression provision to the operation of the stirring up of hatred offences. It does that by indicating whether certain types of expression used in behaviour or material could in themselves meet the thresholds of the offences. For example, the amendment makes it very clear that criticism of matters relating to transgender identity are not solely to be taken to be threatening or abusive. However, if the criticism was expressed in a way that a reasonable person would consider threatening to trans people or that threatened trans people with violence, that could, of course, still amount to behaviour that is threatening or abusive.
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I say to Elaine Smith, who intervened on Adam Tomkins, that none of the statements in the list that she articulated would be prosecuted if they were simply made in a chamber or in discussion, even if that discussion were robust. By the way, the reasonable person test is commonly used in many pieces of legislation; I can write to Elaine Smith with a list of a number of pieces of legislation that use that test.
For such statements to be prosecuted, it would have to be proven that they were made in
“a threatening or abusive manner”.
Even if that test were met—let us say that there was some dubiety about the test—it would still have to be proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that those statements were intended to stir up hatred. Someone who simply and solely—I think that Elaine Smith used the word “solely”—articulated those statements would not be prosecuted, regardless of the robust nature of the discussion.
Amendments 13, 14, 16, 18 to 20 and 22 are consequential to amendment 11.
Before I discuss further amendments in the group, I will reflect on the Justice Committee’s round table on 22 February. We heard very powerful evidence from Iain Smith of Inclusion Scotland. Many colleagues will recall him from his service as a Liberal Democrat MSP. I thought that he spoke incredibly eloquently at the round table on the importance of our freedom of expression provision. He said:
“it important that the bill should send out a clear message about what is and is not acceptable. In that regard, we do not think it appropriate that the bill should list behaviour or language that is acceptable. As I have mentioned, expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule or insult are not without consequences for those who are subjected to them. They can legitimise prejudice and lead to more serious consequences, even if that is not intended. ... do we want to say that it is acceptable to ridicule a disabled person who finds it difficult to get on to a bus thereby causing it to be late, or who is prevented from doing their daily shopping because they are subjected to expressions of dislike or insult? I do not think that the Parliament will want to say that for disabled people. Why should it want to say so for any other group in society? We ask members to think very carefully about that.”—[Official Report, Justice Committee, 22 February 2021; c 11-12.]
Amendment 11B, from Johann Lamont, would insert new wording into the freedom of expression provision. It would have the effect of adding new, specific wording on the operation of the provision, so that certain matters that are asserted, and the advancement or rejection of propositions that follows from those assertions, would be explicitly referred to in the provision.
All of the matters that are listed in amendment 11B are covered by the wording of amendment 11, which captures discussion or criticism of matters relating to each of the characteristics, except—crucially—race, which I have already mentioned. I do not think that there is a need to include a laundry list of specific wording, as is suggested. My worry is that, if we do that, we run the risk of suggesting that
“discussion or criticism of matters”—
which is a wide category—somehow does not already encapsulate the matters that are listed by Johann Lamont. If we create a non-exhaustive list, the problem is that it is, by definition, non-exhaustive, so there can be confusion over what is not included in the list. Therefore, I ask members to oppose amendment 11B.
I also agree with Adam Tomkins that, if his amendment 1, which I will speak to shortly, is accepted, there is no need for the other freedom of expression provisions that are being advanced by Joan McAlpine and Johann Lamont. I will explain that Adam Tomkins’s approach in amendment 1, which has regard to freedom of expression—including with respect to the effects of behaviour and material as part of the operation of the reasonableness defence—is a better approach to the issue.
Amendment 11G, from Joan McAlpine, is similar to elements of amendment 11F. It would add wording to the freedom of expression provision in amendment 11, such that, with regard to “discussion” and “criticism” being covered, it would make clear that that included when such discussion or criticism was “perceived as offensive”.
Although I understand what Joan McAlpine is trying to do with her amendment, my concern has always been that such an approach could have the unintended consequence of implying that criticism that is offensive could never be considered abusive, no matter how extreme the offensive nature of that criticism. If behaviour was, by a reasonable person’s definition, threatening or abusive, and it was intended to stir up hatred, it may not be prosecutable because it would also—in most cases, I suspect—be perceived to be offensive.
I turn to Adam Tomkins’s amendments. The Government will support amendments 1 and 34.
Amendment 1 would apply to all the offences of stirring up hatred when a person has been found to have behaved in a way, or communicated material, that was threatening or abusive and that was intended to stir up hatred, and claims that such behaviour or communication of material was reasonable in the particular circumstances. For the offences of stirring up racial hatred, the additional threshold of being insulting and likely to stir up hatred is also covered.
The effect of amendment 1 is that a court would be required to have particular regard to the importance of freedom of expression under article 10 of the ECHR when determining whether a reasonableness defence was made out. In so doing, the court must have particular regard to the general principle that the right to freedom of expression applies to the expression of information or ideas that offend, shock or disturb. It is right for the bill to give that reassurance. A number of stakeholders have expressed concern that their right to shock, offend or disturb might be compromised by the bill. Amendment 1 puts that beyond reasonable doubt and does it by tying it to the reasonableness defence, so that it does not have unintended adverse consequences.
I note that Adam Tomkins said—if I heard him correctly—that if amendment 1 is accepted, he will not move amendments 2 and 3. Therefore, in the interests of time, I will not go into the details of my concerns about those amendments.
Given the concerns that I have expressed, I cannot support amendments 2, 3, 11G, 11B, 11C, 11D, 11E and 11F. I will support amendments 1 and 34 in the name of Adam Tomkins and ask MSPs to support my amendments 11, 13, 14, 16, 18 to 20 and 22.